LEAD: As BRICS surpasses the G7 with over 40% of global GDP and prepares for its September summit in New Delhi, the bloc’s inability to forge a unified response to the US-Israeli strikes on Iran exposes the fundamental contradiction at the heart of the world’s most ambitious experiment in multipolar governance.
The Economic Giant That No Longer Fits Old Labels
On April 2, 2026, Maxim Oreshkin, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Administration, delivered a deceptively simple statement at the International Transport and Logistics Forum in St. Petersburg: the BRICS countries’ share of global GDP has exceeded 40%, and the trend toward the bloc’s strengthening will continue. Oreshkin described a fundamental shift in economic gravity: “The rapidly growing countries of Southeast Asia, which played a key role in economic growth in the first quarter of this century, will be joined by countries in South Asia and Africa”. The future of trade, he argued, lies increasingly between nations of the Global South.
These are not empty projections. The expanded BRICS—which now includes Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Indonesia alongside the original five—encompasses approximately 49.5% of the world’s population and around 26% of global trade. By purchasing power parity, BRICS nations now represent a larger share of global GDP than the G7, whose share has steadily declined from 57.3% of world GDP in 1993 to just 40.6% in 2022. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has described BRICS as “steadily transforming into a broad global structure attracting growing international interest, reflecting shifts in economic and political power beyond traditional Western alliances”.
Yet for all its economic heft, BRICS remains something less than a traditional alliance. As we documented in our analysis of how the Iran war cracked the Western alliance open, the bloc’s members have found themselves on opposing sides of the conflict—a situation that NATO, for all its recent fissures, has largely avoided.
The West Asia Crucible: Three Members, Three Fronts
The US-Israeli joint military strikes against Iran, launched on February 28, 2026, have placed BRICS under unprecedented strain. At least three member nations are directly involved in the conflict: Iran as the target of strikes, the UAE and Saudi Arabia as Gulf states facing retaliatory Iranian attacks. As India’s Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal acknowledged in March, “Some members of BRICS are directly involved in the current situation in the West Asia region, which has impacted forging a consensus on a common BRICS position”.
The divisions run deep. China and Russia have condemned the US-Israeli attacks, aligning with Tehran. The UAE, however, maintains a different position, shaped by its security dependencies on Washington and its strained relations with Iran. Anil Trigunayat, a West Asia expert, told UNI that “the trust deficit between Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and Iran has further deepened due to repeated strikes on these countries under the pretext of targeting US bases”.
This internal fragmentation has consequences that extend far beyond diplomatic communiqués. The Strait of Hormuz blockade, which cut off 20% of global oil and gas supplies, has pushed crude prices above $111 per barrel—a crisis directly affecting all BRICS members, many of whom are net energy importers. As we reported in our coverage of the Strait of Hormuz blockade, European nations have scrambled to form a 40-country coalition to reopen the waterway. BRICS, by contrast, has issued no formal statement.
India’s Chairmanship: A Test of Diplomatic Capacity
India assumed the BRICS chairship on January 1, 2026, under the theme “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability”. The timing could not be more challenging. New Delhi will host the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on May 14–15, followed by the 18th BRICS Summit in September. Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to attend, his global position arguably strengthened by the conflict.
India’s diplomatic position is uniquely delicate. New Delhi maintains strong ties with both Iran and the Gulf nations, and has been urged by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to play an “independent role” in brokering an end to the war. At the same time, India must preserve its strategic partnerships with the United States, which led the strikes on Iran. This balancing act has forced India to pursue a strategy of quiet engagement rather than public pronouncements.
The May foreign ministers’ meeting will be the first major test. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has confirmed his attendance; Iran and the UAE will also be present. India’s ability to forge even a minimal consensus—perhaps a call for de-escalation that avoids assigning blame—will signal whether BRICS can function as a genuine platform for conflict resolution or merely as a photo opportunity.
Editor’s Conclusions
The contradiction at the heart of BRICS is now impossible to ignore. The bloc’s economic metrics are genuinely impressive: over 40% of global GDP, nearly half the world’s population, and growth rates that consistently outpace the G7. Russian officials project this trend as “fundamental and inevitable”. Yet the Iran crisis has exposed what economists have long understood: economic weight does not automatically translate into political coherence.
Three observations are worth making. First, BRICS was never designed as a security alliance. Unlike NATO, which has integrated military command structures and Article 5 collective defense commitments, BRICS operates as a forum for coordination on economic, financial, and development issues. Expecting it to respond to a war with the speed and unity of a traditional military alliance misunderstands its nature. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Rudenko described BRICS as “quite a flexible organisation” that allows every member state to retain “its own voice”. That flexibility is a feature, not a bug—but it becomes a liability when members find themselves on opposite sides of a shooting war.
Second, the Iran crisis may accelerate, not impede, BRICS’s long-term evolution. The war has made abundantly clear to Gulf states the limits of US security guarantees. Growing disillusionment with Washington has pushed countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE to diversify their strategic partnerships, with increasing interest in groupings like BRICS. Paradoxically, the crisis that has temporarily paralyzed the bloc’s consensus mechanisms may drive deeper institutionalization over time, as members recognize the costs of ad hoc coordination.
Third, India’s chairmanship represents a pivotal moment for the bloc’s identity. New Delhi has historically positioned itself as a bridge between Western and non-Western institutions, maintaining strategic autonomy while deepening ties with both Washington and Moscow. If India can successfully navigate the May foreign ministers’ meeting—perhaps by securing a face-saving communiqué that calls for de-escalation without explicitly condemning either side—it will have demonstrated that BRICS can absorb significant internal friction without fracturing. If it fails, questions about the bloc’s relevance will grow louder.
The broader geopolitical implications are unmistakable. Lavrov has described BRICS as part of a transition toward a multipolar global order. That transition is already underway, regardless of any single summit’s outcome. The question is whether BRICS will shape that transition or merely be shaped by it. For now, the bloc that accounts for 40% of global output remains unable to issue a joint statement about a war involving three of its members. That is not a failure of BRICS as an institution. It is an accurate reflection of a world in which power is genuinely distributed—and genuinely contested.
Executive Summary
- BRICS now accounts for over 40% of global GDP and nearly half the world’s population, surpassing the G7 in purchasing power parity.
- The US-Israeli strikes on Iran have exposed deep divisions within the bloc, with Iran, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia on opposing sides.
- India’s May 2026 foreign ministers’ meeting will test whether BRICS can function as a platform for conflict resolution or remains purely an economic forum.
Internal Links Used
- the Iran war cracked the Western alliance open — placed in Subheading 1
- Strait of Hormuz blockade — placed in Subheading 2
Sources
- BRICS’ share of global GDP exceeds 40% – TASS — Russian state news agency, statement by Kremlin official Maxim Oreshkin on April 2, 2026
- India faces tough BRICS test amid war – UNI — Interview with West Asia expert Anil Trigunayat, April 4, 2026
- India to host Iran, UAE at BRICS foreign ministers’ meet – News18 — Reporting on May 2026 meeting logistics, April 1, 2026
- BRICS: global centre of gravity shifts – New Age — Analysis by Vijay Prashad comparing BRICS and G7 economic metrics
- India’s BRICS Leadership: People-Centric Approach – Rediff — Official Indian government statement on BRICS chairship, April 2, 2026
- BRICS transforming into global structure beyond Western alliances – Asianet Newsable — Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov interview on BRICS evolution
